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Abstract. Secure information flow is the problem of ensuring that the
information made publicly available by a computational system does not
leak information that should be kept secret. Since it is practically impos-
sible to avoid leakage entirely, in recent years there has been a growing
interest in considering the quantitative aspects of information flow, in or-
der to measure and compare the amount of leakage. Information theory
is widely regarded as a natural framework to provide firm foundations
to quantitive information flow. In this notes we review the two main
information-theoretic approaches that have been investigated: the one
based on Shannon entropy, and the one based on Re´nyi min-entropy.
Furthermore, we discuss some applications in the area of privacy. In
particular, we consider statistical databases and the recently-proposed
notion of differential privacy. Using the information-theoretic view, we
discuss the bound that differential privacy induces on leakage, and the
trade-off between utility and privacy.
1 Introduction
In the last few decades the amount of information flowing through computational
systems has increased dramatically. Never before in history has a society been so
dependent on such a huge amount of information being generated, transmitted
and processed. It is expected that this vertiginous trend of increase will continue
in the near future, reinforcing the need for efficient and safe ways to cope with
this reality.
One of the concerns in the use of computational systems is to avoid the
leakage of secret information through public observables. If some information is
supposed to be confidential, then unauthorized users should not be allowed to
infer such information from the output or the behavior of the system.
Ideally we would like systems to be completely secure, i.e. protect the secret
information entirely, but in practice this goal is usually impossible to achieve.
The following example illustrates some of the issues.
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Example 1. Consider the password-checker algorithm defined in Table 1, where
out := OK
for i = 1, ..., N do
if xi 6= Ki then
out := FAIL
exit()
end if
end for
Table 1. Password-
checker pseudocode.
K1K2 . . .KN is the sequence of N digits that com-
pose a password, and x1x2 . . . xN is the string entered
by the user. An attacker may obtain the password by
simply trying a string, if she is so lucky to guess the
string that matches the password.
Furthermore, even if the attacker makes the
wrong guess, she still obtains some (small) amount
of information: the information that the password is
not the string she just entered, thus restricting the
guessing range of potential further attempts.
Worse yet, the algorithm is subject to timing at-
tacks: the attacker may be able to determine from
the duration of the execution how many iterations are performed, thus inferring
a prefix of the password even in case of failure.
Thus it is important to express the amount of leakage in quantitative terms,
so to be able to assess whether a system is better than another, although they
may both be insecure.
Another reason to consider the quantitative aspects is that the system may
have a probabilistic behavior. This is the case, for instance, of anonymity proto-
cols, which use randomization to obfuscate the link between the identity of the
culprit and the observable outcome.
Example 2. DC-Net is a protocol for anonymous broadcasting based on the
paradigm of the dining cryptographers [8].
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Fig. 1. Example of a
dc-net.
The participants in the protocol are assumed to
be the vertexes of a graph, whose edges are associ-
ated to binary coins which are visible to the adja-
cent vertexes. The protocol works as follows: sup-
pose that a participant x wants to broadcast one bit
b. Then, all coins get flipped, and each participant
reads the value of the coins which are visible to her
and computes the binary sum of these values. Then
all participants but x declare the result, while x (bi-
narily) adds b to her result, and then declares it.
Fig. 1 illustrates the situation, where the labels of
the edges represent the outcome of the coin tosses, and the labels of the vertices
represent the declaration of each user (i.e the binary sum they calculate).
It is easy to see that, since each coin is counted twice, the global contribution
of all coins is 0. Hence the binary sum of all the declarations gives b, thus achiev-
ing the goal of making b public. Furthermore thanks to the “noise” created by
the coins, it is generally impossible for an adversary to determine with certainty
the culprit, i.e. the vertex who is broadcasting b. We will see that a stronger
property actually holds: if the coins are fair, and the graph is connected, then
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for an external adversary the probability of each vertex to be the culprit does
not change after she observes the declarations.
Several authors have proposed to use concepts from information theory to
model information flow and to define the leakage in a quantitative way. So far,
most of the approaches were based on Shannon entropy [23, 22, 28, 9, 19, 20, 6].
This is probably due to the fact that Shannon entropy is the most established
and useful notion of entropy in information theory, because of its mathematical
properties and its correspondence with the channel transmission rate. Never-
theless, other notions based on information theory have been considered, and
argued to be more appropriate for security in certain scenarios. These include:
Re´nyi min-entropy [25, 27], guessing entropy [21], and marginal guesswork [24].
The common idea in these information-theoretic approaches is that a system
can be seen as a channel in the information-theoretic sense, where the secret is
the input and the observables are the output. The entropy of the input provides a
measure of its vulnerability, i.e. how easy is for an attacher to discover the secret.
Therefore, as argued in [?], the notion of entropy should be chosen according
to the model of attacker, and to the way we extimate the success of the attack.
Normally, the entropy of a random variable represents its uncertainty, hence the
vulnerability is anti-monotonic on the entropy.
Independently from the intended model of attacker, the notion of leakage can
be expressed in a uniform way as the difference between the initial uncertainty
about the secret, i.e. the uncertainty before we run the system, and the remaining
uncertainty about the secret, i.e. the uncertainty after we run the system and
observe its outcome:
information leakage = initial uncertainty − remaining uncertainty (1)
In general the observation of the outcome should increase the probabilistic
knowledge about the secret, and consequently decrease the corresponding uncer-
tainty. Therefore we expect the result of (1) to be non-negative. This is indeed
the case, for all the notions of entropy mentioned above, when the channel is
deterministic. In the more general case of a probabilistic channel, however, the
non-negativeness is ensured only for Shannon entropy and for Re´nyi min-entropy.
In these notes we aim at encompassing also the probabilistic case, hence we will
restrict to the latter two notions of entropy.
1.1 Application to privacy
Recently, the above notions have been applied also to the problem of statistical
disclosure control in the area of databases. The goal is to learn properties of the
population as a whole, while maintaining the privacy of individuals. For example,
in medical research it is desirable to collect the personal medical information of
a large number of individuals. Researchers or public authorities can calculate a
series of statistics from the sample and decide, for instance, how much money
the health care system should spend next year in the treatment of a specific
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disease. It desirable, however, that the participation in the sample will not harm
the privacy of any individual: usually people do not want to have disclosed their
specific status with respect to a given disease, or other personal matters. Some
studies show indeed that when individuals are guaranteed anonymity and privacy
they tend to be more cooperative in giving in personal information [?].
The fact that the answer is publicly available, however, constitutes a threat
for the privacy of the individuals. For instance, assume that we are interested
in the query “what is the percentage of individuals with a given disease?”. The
addition of an individual to the database will modify the percentage, and reveal
whether the individual has the disease or not.
A common solution to the above problem is to introduce some output pertur-
bation mechanism based on randomization: instead of the exact answer to the
query, we report a “noisy” answer. Namely, we use some randomized function
K which produces values according to some probability distribution. Of course,
depending on the distribution, it may still be possible to guess the value of an
individual with a high probability of success, i.e. there may still be a risk of vio-
lating privacy. The notion of differential privacy, due to Dwork [12, 15, 13, 14], is
a proposal to control such a risk. The idea is to say that K provides -differential
privacy (for some  > 0) if the ratio between the probabilities that two adja-
cent databases give the same answer is bound by e, where by “adjacent” we
mean that the databases differ for only one individual. Often we will abbreviate
“-differential privacy” as -d.p.
Obviously, the smaller is , the greater is the privacy protection. In particular,
when  is close to 0 the output of K is nearly independent from the input (all
distributions are almost equal). Unfortunately, such K is practically useless. The
utility, i.e. the capability to retrieve accurate answers from the reported ones, is
the other important characteristic of K, and it is clear that there is a trade-off
between utility and privacy. These two notions, however, are not the complete
opposite of each other, because utility concerns the relation between the reported
answer and the real answer, while privacy is concerns the relation between the
reported answer and the information in the database. This asymmetry makes
more interesting the problem of finding a good compromise between the two.
At this point, we would like to remark an intriguing analogy between the area
of differential privacy and that of quantitative information flow (QIF), both in
the motivations and in the conceptual framework. At the motivational level,
the concern about privacy is akin the concern about information leakage. At
the conceptual level, the randomized function K can be seen as an information-
theoretic channel, and the limit case of  = 0, for which the privacy protection
is total, corresponds to the case in which the answer to the query does not add
any information about the input distribution, and therefore the leakage is 0.
In this notes we recall the notion of differential privacy and its implications, in
light of the min-entropy framework developed for QIF. In particular, we explore
the relation between -d.p., leakage, and utility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section we discuss
and compare Shannon entropy and Re´nyi min-entropy, and their interpretation
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in terms of attack models. In Section 3 we illustrate the interpretation of systems
as channels, from the point of view of leakage, and we review the main results
concerning the information-theoretic approaches based on these two notions of
entropy. In Section 4 we show that -differential privacy induces a bound on the
leakage of statistical databases. In Section 5 we show that -differential privacy
induces a bound also on their utility, and we present a method to define a
randomization mechanism that gives the maximum utility while providing -
differential privacy. In Section 6 we discuss some related work on the relation
between differential privacy and QIF.
2 Adversary models and entropy notions
In this section we review the two main notions of entropy used in the literature
on quantitative information flow, and we discuss the relation with the model of
attacker.
In general we consider the kind of threats that in the model of [?] are called
brute-force guessing attacks, which can be summarized as follows: The goal of
the adversary is to determine the value of a random variable. He can make a
series of queries to an oracle. Each query must have a yes/no answer. In general
the adversary is adaptive, i.e. he can choose the next query depending on the
answer to the previous ones. We assume that the adversary knows the probability
distribution.
In the following, X,Y denote two discrete random variables with finite car-
riers X = {x1, . . . , xn}, Y = {y1, . . . , ym}, and probability distributions pX(·),
pY (·), respectively. We will use X∧Y to represent the random variable with car-
rier X × Y and joint probability distribution pX∧Y (x, y) = pX(x) · pY |X(y | x),
where pY |X(y | x) is the conditional probability that Y = y when X = x. The
notation X ·Y will denote the random variable with carrier X ×Y and probabil-
ity distribution defined as product, i.e. pX·Y (x, y) = pX(x) · pY (y). Clearly if X
and Y are independent we have X ∧ Y = X · Y . We shall omit the subscripts
on the probabilities when they are clear from the context. In general, pX(·) is
called a priori distribution of X, and the conditional probability pX|Y (· | ·) is
called a posteriori distribution of X given Y . We will also refer to the individual
probabilities p(x) and p(x|y) as the a priori an the a posteriori probabilities of
x.
2.1 Shannon entropy
In this section we illustrate a model of adversary that corresponds to Shannon
entropy. The ideas discussed here are based on the works [24, 18].
Definition 1. A Shannon adversary is characterized by questions of the form
“is X ∈ X ′?”, where X ′ ⊆ X . Her goal is to determine exactly the value of X,
and to do it as fast as possible, i.e. with a minimum number of questions.
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Clearly the strategy of the adversary in choosing the sets X ′ will have an
influence on the number of queries necessary to determine the value of X. Intu-
itively the best strategy is to choose X ′ so that its mass probability is as close
as possible to that of X ′′ \ X ′, where X ′′ is the set of values that are currently
determined as possible for X. The next example illustrates the situation.
Example 3. Consider the set X = {a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h}, and assume that the prob-
ability is distributed as follows:
p(a) = p(b) =
1
4
p(c) = p(d) =
1
8
p(e) = p(f) = p(g) = p(h) =
1
16
Fig. 2. Search space
Fig. 2 illustrates a possible strategy of the ad-
versary. The leafs represent the secrets, i.e. the
elements of X . Each internal node is labeled
with a set X ′ ⊆ X , representing the query “is
X ∈ X ′?”. Depending on the answer to the
query, the adversary will continue searching in
the left or in the right subtree. In this particu-
lar case, at each step the left and the right sub-
trees have the same probability mass, and as we
will see later this means that the strategy is opti-
mal.
For a given strategy σ of the adversary, let nσ(x) be the number of questions
that are needed to determine the value of X when X = x. For instance, in the
example above, we have nσ(a) = 2, and nσ(e) = 4. The expected value of nσ is:
Enσ = p(a) nσ(a) + . . .+ p(f) nσ(f) = 2×
1
4
2 + 2× 1
8
3 + 4× 1
16
4 =
11
4
Note that if we replace nσ(·) by log2 p(·) in the above definition of Enσ , we obtain
the formula for Shannon entropy (cf. Definition 2).
Coming back to Fig. 2, we wish remark that each element x ∈ X is uniquely
associated to the path from the root to the leaf associated to x. If we label the arcs
of the tree with 0 (left) and 1 (right), then each x ∈ X can be represented by the
binary string relative to the path. The problem of minimizing the expected value
of nσ corresponds therefore to that of finding the optimal coding, i.e. the coding
that minimize the expected number of bits needed to represent the elements of
X . Shannon entropy is also related to the optimal coding, and more precisely it
corresponds to the expected length of the code.
Definition 2 ([26]). The Shannon entropy of a random variable X is defined
as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log2 p(x)
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The minimum value H(X) = 0 is obtained when p(·) is concentrated on a
single value (i.e. when p(·) is a Dirac measure 1). The maximum value H(X) =
log2 |X | is obtained when p(·) is the uniform distribution. Usually the base of
the logarithm is set to be 2 and, correspondingly, the entropy is measured in
bits.
Proposition 1. H(X) is a lower bound for the expected value of nσ(·), with
respect to all possible strategies σ.
Note that the lover bound mentioned in the above proposition (i.e. the en-
tropy) is actually achieved in Example 3. Indeed, a simple calculation shows that
H(X) = 114 . In general the lower bound H(X) can be achieved when for each
x ∈ X we have that p(x) is a power of 2, and we can organize the questions as
a tree, with the characteristic that each node (question) splits the probability
mass in two.
We end this section with the definition of conditional entropy.
Definition 3. The conditional entropy of X given Y is
H(X | Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) H(X | Y = y) (2)
where
H(X | Y = y) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x|y) log2 p(x|y)
It is possible to prove that 0 ≤ H(X | Y ) ≤ H(X). The minimum value, 0, is
obtained when X is completely determined by Y . The maximum value, H(X),
is obtained when Y reveals no information about X, i.e. when X and Y are
independent.
2.2 Re´nyi min-entropy
In this section we illustrate a model of adversary that corresponds to Re´nyi
min-entropy (or simply min-entropy). This material is based on [27].
Definition 4. In the one-try model the adversary is allowed to ask exactly one
question, which must be of the form: “is X = x?”. Her goal is to maximize the
probability of guessing the right element in just one single try.
Of course, the best strategy for the adversary consists in choosing the x
with the maximum probability. Therefore the measure of success of this kind of
adversary is maxx∈X p(x).
We discuss now how the probability of success is related to the Re´nyi min-
entropy. Let us first give a quick overview of the context in which this concept
originated.
1 A Dirac measure or point mass is a distribution δw(x) that has the value 1 on the
point x = w and 0 otherwise.
7
In [25], Re´nyi introduced a one-parameter family of entropy measures, in-
tended as a generalization of Shannon entropy. The Re´nyi entropy of order α
(α > 0, α 6= 1) of a random variable X is defined as
Hα(X) =
1
1− α log2
∑
x∈X
p(x)α
Re´nyi’s motivations were of axiomatic nature: Shannon entropy satisfies four
axioms, namely symmetry, continuity, value 1 on the Bernoulli uniform distri-
bution, and the chain rule2:
H(X ∧ Y ) = H(X |Y ) +H(Y ) (3)
Shannon entropy is also the only function that satisfies those axioms. How-
ever, if we replace (3) with a weaker property representing the additivity of
entropy for independent distributions:
H(X · Y ) = H(X) +H(Y )
then there are more functions satisfying the axioms, among which all those of
the Re´nyi’s family.
Shannon entropy is obtained by taking the limit of Hα as α approaches 1. In
fact we can easily prove, using l’Hoˆpital’s rule, that
H1(X)
def
= lim
α→1
Hα(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log2 p(x)
We are particularly interested in the limit of Hα as α approaches ∞. This is
called min-entropy. It can be proven that
H∞(X)
def
= lim
α→∞Hα(X) = − log2 maxx∈X p(x)
which gives the connection with the model of adversary described in Definition 4.
As for the α-generalization of the conditional entropy, Re´nyi did not define
it, and there is no agreement on what it should be. Various researchers, including
Cachin [5], have considered the following definition, based on (2):
HCachinα (X | Y ) =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) Hα(X | Y = y)
which, as α→∞, becomes
HCachin∞ (X | Y ) = −
∑
y∈Y
p(y) log2 max
x∈X
p(x | y)
2 The original axiom, called the grouping axiom, does not mention the conditional
entropy. However it corresponds to the chain rule if the conditional entropy is defined
as in (2).
8
An alternative proposal for H∞(· | ·) came from [?,11], and was again advocated
by Smith in his seminal paper [27]:
HSmith∞ (X | Y ) = − log2
∑
y∈Y maxx∈X p(x, y) (4)
The most interesting version of H∞(X | Y ), in terms of security, seems to
be that of Smith: Indeed,
∑
y∈Y maxx∈X p(x, y) represents the expected value
of the a posteriori probability of the adversary’s success. The complement of
this expected value is also known as probability of error or Bayes risk, and has
been used as a measure of information flow also by other authors [7]. Observing
Y decreases the probability of error, and consequently we can prove formally
that HSmith∞ (X | Y ) ≤ H∞(X), with equality if X and Y are independent. This
inequality will ensure that the leakage is always nonnegative, and it is therefore
another reason to choose HSmith∞ (· | ·): the alternative HCachin∞ (· | ·) does not
have this feature.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we will omit the superscript
“Smith” and simply write H∞(· | ·).
3 Information leakage and channels
In this section we consider the interpretation of the leakage in computational
systems in terms of channels, and we review some results concerning the Shannon
and the min-entropy approaches.
The main idea is that if we focus on the problem of the leakage of secret
information trough public observables, then we can regard a computational sys-
tem as an information-theoretic channel, where the secrets are the inputs, and
the observables are the outputs. In the following examples we revisit the ones in
the introduction to illustrate this principle.
Example 4. Consider again the password-checker algorithm defined in Exam-
ple 1. Assume that the password is 110. Depending on whether the adversary
is supposed to be able to detect the number of iterations or not, we have two
different channels, as illustrated in the figure below. In the first one, the observ-
able output of the system is either an acceptance of the entered code (OK) or a
rejection (Fail). In the second, the observable can be an acceptance (OK), or a
rejection together with the number i of iteractions executed (the tuple (Fail,i)).
Note that the program is deterministic, and this is reflected by the fact that, in
both channels, each input corresponds to only one output.
Example 5. Consider the dc-nets of Example 2, and consider a particularly sim-
ple case: a net with two nodes only, connected by an edge, as illustrated in
Fig. 4(a). The channel, illustrated in Fig. 4(b), takes as input the identity of the
agent and the bit that she wants to broadcast3. On the right-hand side, the each
9
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010
011
100
101
110
111
Fail
OK
(a) No iteration count
000
001
010
011
100
101
110
111
(Fail,1)
(Fail,2)
(Fail,3)
OK
(b) Counting the iterations
Fig. 3. Channels associated with the program in Example 1. The password is 110.
a bcoin
(a) A dc-net with
two nodes
(a, 1)
(b, 1)
(a, 0)
(b, 0)
10
01
00
11
(b) Channel associated with
the two-nodes dc-net
Fig. 4. A simple dc-net and its channel.
bit of the string represents the declarations of one of the two nodes. Note that
this program is not deterministic. The input (a, 1), for instance, can produce two
different outcomes: the declaration 10, produced when the coin is 0 (assuming
that the first bit from left to right is the declaration of a). The other possible
declaration, 01, is produced when the coin is 1.
In general, a channel is probabilistic, and it is characterized by its channel
matrix.
Definition 5. An information-theoretic channel is a triple (X,Y,M) where X
and Y are two random variables representing the input and the output, respec-
tively, and M is a matrix (called the channel matrix) which contains the condi-
tional probabilities p(y|x) for each x ∈ X and each y ∈ Y.
Example 6. The matrices associated to the channels in Figures 3(a) and 3(b)
are given in Tables 2(a) and 2(b), respectively. Note that they contain only 0’s
and 1’s. This is characteristic of deterministic channels.
Example 7. Consider again Example 2. The channel matrix depends on the
coins: whether they are biased, and how much biased they are. Here we con-
sider the simple two-nodes net of Example 5 and two particular situations: the
3 One may argue that the bit to be broadcasted should not be considered as a secret,
and that having it as input will alter the computation of the leakage. This is a valid
observation, but there is no harm in representing this bit as input, because we can
still remove its contribution to the leakage when we make the calculation.
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(a) No iter. c.
Fail OK
000 1 0
001 1 0
010 1 0
011 1 0
100 1 0
101 1 0
110 0 1
111 1 0
(b) Counting the iterations
(Fail, 1) (Fail, 2) (Fail, 3) OK
000 1 0 0 0
001 1 0 0 0
010 1 0 0 0
011 1 0 0 0
100 0 1 0 0
101 0 1 0 0
110 0 0 0 1
111 0 0 1 0
Table 2. Channel matrices for the password-checker algorithm
case in which the coins are unbiased (cf. Table 3(a)) and the case in which they
are all biased in favor of 0, and more precisely, they give 0 with probability 23
(cf. Table 3(b)).
(a) Fair coin
10 01 00 11
(a, 1) 1
2
1
2
0 0
(b, 1) 1
2
1
2
0 0
(a, 0) 0 0 1
2
1
2
(b, 0) 0 0 1
2
1
2
(b) Biased coin
(p(0) = 23 , p(1) =
1
3 )
10 01 00 11
(a, 1) 2
3
1
3
0 0
(b, 1) 1
3
2
3
0 0
(a, 0) 0 0 2
3
1
3
(b, 0) 0 0 2
3
1
3
Table 3. Channel matrices for the two-node dc-net of Example 5
We consider now the definition of leakage for the two approaches.
3.1 Leakage in the Shannon approach
As explained in the introduction, we regard the leakage as the difference between
the initial uncertainty and the remaining uncertainty after the observation. Since
the uncertainty is represented by the entropy, the leakage can be represented by
the well-known (information-theoretic) notion of mutual information, which is
the difference between the entropy of the input and the conditional entropy of
the input given the output:
Definition 6. The mutual information between A and B is defined as
I(X;Y ) = H(X)−H(X | Y )
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and it measures the amount of information about X that we gain by observing
Y .
It can be shown that I(X;Y ) = I(Y ;X) and 0 ≤ I(X;Y ) ≤ H(X). The notion
of capacity, defined as
C = max
pX(·)
I(X;Y )
is often used to represent the worst-case leakage.
We end this section with some relevant properties of the Shannon capacity:
Proposition 2. The capacity of a channel is 0 if and only if all the rows of
the matrix are identical. The capacity is maximum (i.e. equal to H(X)) if each
column has at most one positive value. If |X| ≤ |Y |, then also the converse holds.
3.2 Leakage in the min-entropy approach
Also in the case of min-entropy the leakage can be expressed using a concept
analogous to mutual information4:
I∞(X;Y ) = H∞(X)−H∞(X | Y )
and analogously for the capacity:
C∞ = max
pX(·)
I∞(X;Y )
This min-entropy variant of the capacity is called min-capacity. Only a weak
form of Proposition 2 holds for C∞, namely, only the if part.
Proposition 3. The min-capacity of a channel is 0 if all the rows of the matrix
are identical. The capacity is maximum (i.e. equal to H∞(X)) if each column
has at most one positive value.
It has been proven in [4] that C∞ is always obtained at the uniform distri-
bution (although this is not necessarily the only possible distribution to achieve
capacity), and that it is equal to the sum of the maxima of each column in the
channel matrix, i.e. C∞ =
∑
b∈Bmaxa∈A p(b | a).
4 Differential privacy: leakage
In this section we discuss the notion of differential privacy and we show the
relation with the notion of leakage. We only consider here the min-entropy notion
of leakage.
4 Some authors, including Smith, prefer avoiding the notation I∞ and referring to it as
“mutual information” because some of the properties of Shannon mutual information
are not satisfied in the min-entropy case. In particular, symmetry is not satisfied,
i.e. I∞(X;Y ) 6= I∞(Y ;X) in general.
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Let us start with some definitions. Let Ind be a finite set of individuals that
may participate in a database and Val a finite set of possible values for the
attribute of interest of these individuals. In order to capture in a uniform way
the presence/absence of an individual in the database, as well as its value, we
assume that the set of possible values has a special element null representing the
absence of the individual in the database. Thus the set of all possible databases
is the set X = Val Ind . We will use u and v to denote the cardinalities of Ind and
Val , |Ind | and |Val |, respectively. Hence we have that |X | = vu . A database x
can be represented as a u-tuple v0v1 . . . vu−1 where each vi ∈ Val is the value of
the corresponding individual. Two databases x, x′ are adjacent (or neighbors),
written x ∼ x′, if they differ for the value of exactly one individual. For instance,
for u = 3, v0v1v2 and v0w1v2, with w1 6= v1, are adjacent. The structure (X ,∼)
forms an undirected graph.
Intuitively, differential privacy is based on the idea that a randomized query
function provides sufficient protection if the ratio between the probabilities of
two adjacent databases to give a certain answer is bound by e, for some given
 > 0. Formally:
Definition 7 ([14]). A randomized function K from X to Z provides -differential
privacy if for all pairs x, x′ ∈ X , with x ∼ x′, and all S ⊆ Z, we have that:
Pr [K(x) ∈ S] ≤ e × Pr [K(x′) ∈ S]
The above definition takes into account the possibility that Z is a continuous
domain. In our case, since Z is finite, the probability distribution is discrete,
and we can rewrite the property of -d.p. more simply as (using the notation of
conditional probabilities, and considering both quotients):
1
e
≤ Pr [Z = z|X = x]
Pr [Z = z|X = x′] ≤ e
 for all x, x′ ∈ X with x ∼ x′, and all z ∈ Z
where X and Z represent the random variables associated to X and Z, respec-
tively.
4.1 Graph symmetries
In this section we explore some classes of graphs that allow us to derive a strict
correspondence between -d.p. and the a posteriori entropy of the input.
Let us first recall some basic notions. Given a graph G = (V,∼), the distance
d(v, w) between two vertices v, w ∈ V is the number of edges in a shortest path
connecting them. The diameter of G is the maximum distance between any two
vertices in V. The degree of a vertex is the number of edges incident to it. G is
called regular if every vertex has the same degree. A regular graph with vertices
of degree k is called a k-regular graph. An automorphism of G is a permutation
σ of the vertex set X , such that for any pair of vertices x, x′, if x ∼ x′, then
σ(x) ∼ σ(x′). If σ is an automorphism, and v a vertex, the orbit of v under σ is
the set {v, σ(v), . . . , σk−1(v)} where k is the smallest positive integer such that
σk(v) = v. Clearly, the orbits of the vertices under σ define a partition of V.
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The following two definitions introduce the classes of graphs that we are
interested in. The first class is well known in literature.
Definition 8. Given a graph G = (V,∼), we say that G is distance-regular if
there exist integers bi, ci, i = 0, ..., d such that for any two vertices v, w in V
with distance i = d(v, w), there are exactly ci neighbors of w in Gi−1(x) and
bi neighbors of v in Gi+1(x), where Gi(x) is the set of vertices y of G with
d(x, y) = i.
The next class is a variant of the VT (vertex-transitive) class:
Definition 9. A graph G = (V,∼) is VT+ (vertex-transitive +) if there are
n automorphisms σ0, σ1, . . .σn−1, where n = |V|, such that, for every vertex
v ∈ V, we have that {σi(v) | 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1} = V.
In particular, the graphs for which there exists an automorphism σ which
induces only one orbit are VT+: in fact it is sufficient to define σi = σ
i for all i
from 0 to n− 1.
From graph theory we know that neither of the two classes subsumes the
other. They have however a non-empty intersection, which contains in particular
all the structures of the form (ValInd ,∼), i.e. the database domains.
Proposition 4. The structure (X ,∼) = (ValInd ,∼) is both a distance-regular
graph and a VT+ graph.
The two symmetry classes defined above, distance-regular and VT+, will be
used in the next section to transform a generic channel matrix into a matrix
with a symmetric structure, while preserving the a posteriori min entropy and
the -d.p.. This is the core of our technique to establish the relation between
differential privacy and quantitive information flow, depending on the structure
induced by the database adjacency relation.
4.2 Deriving the relation between differential privacy and QIF on
the basis of the graph structure
This section discusses a general technique for determining the relation between
-differential privacy and min-entropy leakage, and between -differential privacy
and utility, depending on the graph structure induced by ∼ and f . The idea is
to use the symmetries of the graph structure to transform the channel matrix
into an equivalent matrix with certain regularities, which allow to establish the
link between -differential privacy and the a posteriori min entropy.
Let us illustrate briefly this transformation. Consider a channel whose matrix
M has at least as many columns as rows. First, we transform M into a matrix
M ′ in which each of the first n columns has a maximum in the diagonal, and
the remaining columns are all 0’s. Second, under the assumption that the input
domain is distance-regular or VT+, we transform M ′ into a matrix M ′′ whose
diagonal elements are all the same, and coincide with the maximum element of
M ′′, which we denote here by maxM
′′
.
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We are now going to present formally our the technique. Let us first fix
some notation: In the rest of this section we consider channels with input A
and output B, with carriers A and B respectively, and we assume that the
probability distribution of A is uniform. This is not a restriction for our bounds
on the leakage: as seen in the previous section, the maximum min-entropy leakage
is achieved in the uniform input distribution and, therefore, any bound for the
uniform input distribution is also a bound for all other input distributions. In the
case of utility the assumption of uniform input distribution is more restrictive,
but we will see that it still provides interesting results for several practical cases.
Furthermore, we assume that |A| = n ≤ |B| = m. We also assume an adja-
cency relation ∼ on A, i.e. that (A,∼) is an undirected graph structure. With a
slight abuse of notation, we will also write i ∼ h when i and h are associated to
adjacent elements of A, and we will write d(i, h) to denote the distance between
the elements of A associated to i and h.
We note that a channel matrix M provides -d.p. if for each column j and
for each pair of rows i and h such that i ∼ h we have that:
1
e
≤ Mi,j
Mh,j
≤ e.
The a posteriori entropy of a channel with matrixM will be denoted byHM∞ (A|B).
Theorem 1. Consider a matrix M , and let r be a row of M . Assume that (A,∼)
is either distance-regular or VT+, and that M provides -d.p. For each distance
d from 0 to the diameter of (A,∼), let nd be the number of nodes j at distance
d from r. Then we have that:
HM∞ (A|B) ≥ − log2
1∑
d
nd
e d
(5)
Note that this bound is tight, in the sense that we can build a matrix for
which (5) holds with equality.
In the next section, we will see how to use this theorem for establishing a
bound on the leakage and on the utility.
4.3 Application to leakage
As already hinted in the introduction, we can regard K as a channel with input X
and output Z. From Proposition 4 we know that (X ,∼) is both distance-regular
and VT+, we can therefore apply Theorem 1. Let us fix a particular database
x ∈ X . The number of databases at distance d from x is
nd =
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)d (6)
where u = |Ind | and v = Val . In fact, recall that x can be represented as a
u-tuple with values in Val. We need to select d individuals in the u-tuple and
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Fig. 5. Schema of an oblivious randomized function
then change their values, and each of them can be changed in v − 1 different
ways.
Using the nd from (6) in Theorem 1 we obtain a binomial expansion in the
denominator, namely:
HM∞ (X|Z) ≥ − log2
1
u∑
d=0
(
u
d
)
(v − 1)d e
(u−d)
e u
= −u log2
e
v − 1 + e
which gives the following result:
Theorem 2. If K provides -d.p., then for the uniform input distribution the
information leakage is bound from above as follows:
I∞(X;Z) ≤ u log2
v e
v − 1 + e
5 Differential privacy: utility
We turn now our attention to the issue of utility. We focus on the case in which
K is oblivious, which means that it depends only on the (exact) answer to the
query, i.e. on the value of f(x), and not on x.
An oblivious function can be decomposed in the concatenation of two chan-
nels, one representing the function f , and the other representing the randomiza-
tion mechanism H added as output perturbation. The situation is illustrated in
Figure 5.
The standard way to define utility is by means of guess and gain functions.
The functionality of the first is guess : Z → Y, and it represents the user’s
strategy to retrieve the correct answer form the reported one. The functionality
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of the latter is gain : Y ×Y → R. the value gain(y, y′) represents the reward for
guessing the answer y when the correct answer is y′. The utility U can then be
defined as the expected gain:
U(Y, Z) =
∑
y,z
p(y, z) gain(guess(z), y)
We focus here on the so-called binary gain function, which is defined as
gain(y, y′) =
{
1 if y = y′
0 otherwise
This kind of function represents the case in which there is no reason to prefer
an answer over the other, except if it is the right answer. More precisely, we get
a gain if and only if we guess the right answer.
If the gain function is binary, and the guess function represents the user’s
best strategy, i.e. it is chosen to optimize utility, then there is a well-known
correspondence between U and the Bayes risk / the a posteriori min entropy.
Such correspondence is expressed by the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Assume that gain is binary and guess is optimal. Then:
U(Y,Z) =
∑
z
max
y
(p(z|y) p(y)) = 2−H∞(Y |Z)
In order to analyze the implications of the -d.p. requirement on the utility,
we need to consider the structure that the adjacency relation induces on Y. Let
us define ∼ on Y as follows: y ∼ y′ if there are x, x′ ∈ X such that y = f(x),
y′ = f(x′), and x ∼ x′. Note that K provides -d.p. if and only if H provides
-d.p. (and H has as inputs only values that are also outputs of f).
If (Y,∼) is distance-regular or VT+, then we can apply Theorem 1 to find a
bound on the utility. In the following, we assume that the distribution of Y is
uniform.
Theorem 3. Consider a randomized mechanism H, and let y be an element of
Y. Assume that (Y,∼) is either distance-regular or VT+ and that H provides
-d.p. For each distance d from 0 to the diameter of (Y,∼), let nd be the number
of nodes y′ at distance d from y. Then we have that:
U(Y,Z) ≤ 1∑
d
nd
e d
(7)
The above bound is tight, in the sense that (provided (Y,∼) is distance-
regular or VT+) we can construct a mechanism H which satisfies (7) with equal-
ity. More precisely, define
c =
1∑
d
nd
e d
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Then define H (here identified with its channel matrix for simplicity) as follows:
Hi,j = c
e d(i,j)
(8)
Theorem 4. Assume (Y,∼) is distance-regular or VT+. Then the matrix H
defined in (8) provides -d.p. and has maximal utility:
U(Y,Z) = 1∑
d
nd
e d
Note that we can always define H as in (8): the matrix so defined will be
a legal channel matrix, and it will provide -d.p.. However, if (Y,∼) is neither
distance-regular nor VT+, then the utility of such H is not necessarily optimal.
We end this section with an example (borrowed from [1]) to illustrate our
technique.
Example 8. Consider a database with electoral information where each row cor-
responds to a voter and contains the following three fields:
– Id : a unique (anonymized) identifier assigned to each voter;
– City : the name of the city where the user voted;
– Candidate: the name of the candidate the user voted for.
Consider the query “What is the city with the greatest number of votes for
a given candidate cand?”. For such a query the binary utility function is the
natural choice: only the right city gives some gain, and all wrong answers are
equally bad. It is easy to see that every two answers are neighbors, i.e. the graph
structure of the answers is a clique.
Let us consider the scenario where the set of cities is Cities = {A,B,C,D,E, F}
and assume for simplicity that there is a unique answer for the query, i.e., there
are no two cities with exactly the same number of individuals voting for the same
candidate. Table 4 shows two alternative mechanisms providing -differential pri-
vacy (with  = log 2). The first one, M1, is based on the truncated geometric
mechanism method used in [16] for counting queries (here extended to the case
where every pair of answers is neighbor). The second mechanism, M2, is obtained
by applying the definition (8). From Theorem 4 we know that for the uniform
input distribution M2 gives optimal utility.
For the uniform input distribution, it is easy to see that U(M1) = 0.2242 <
0.2857 = U(M2). Even for non-uniform distributions, our mechanism still pro-
vides better utility. For instance, for p(A) = p(F ) = 1/10 and p(B) = p(C) =
p(D) = P (E) = 1/5, we have U(M1) = 0.2412 < 0.2857 = U(M2). This is not
too surprising: the geometric mechanism, as well as the Laplacian mechanism
proposed by Dwork, perform very well when the domain of answers is provided
with a metric and the utility function is not binary5. It also works well when
5 In the metric case the gain function can take into account the proximity of the
reported answer to the real one, the idea being that a close answer, even if wrong,
is better than a distant one.
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(a) M1: truncated geometric mechanism
In/Out A B C D E F
A 0.535 0.060 0.052 0.046 0.040 0.267
B 0.465 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.046 0.307
C 0.405 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.053 0.353
D 0.353 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.060 0.405
E 0.307 0.046 0.053 0.060 0.069 0.465
F 0.267 0.040 0.046 0.052 0.060 0.535
(b) M2: our mechanism
In/Out A B C D E F
A 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
B 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
C 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7 1/7
D 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7 1/7
E 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7 1/7
F 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 1/7 2/7
Table 4. Mechanisms for the city with higher number of votes for candidate cand
(Y,∼) has low connectivity, in particular in the cases of a ring and of a line. But
in this example, we are not in these cases, because we are considering binary
gain functions and high connectivity.
6 Related work
As far as we know, the first work to investigate the relation between differential
privacy and information-theoretic leakage for an individual was [2]. In this work,
a channel is relative to a given database x, and the channel inputs are all possible
databases adjacent to x. Two bounds on leakage were presented, one for teh
Re´nyi min entropy, and one for Shannon entropy.
Barthe and Ko¨pf [3] were the first to investigate the (more challenging) con-
nection between differential privacy and the Re´nyi min-entropy leakage for the
entire universe of possible databases. They consider the “end-to-end differen-
tially private mechanisms”, which correspond to what we call K in our paper,
and propose, like we do, to interpret them as information-theoretic channels.
They provide a bound for the leakage, but point out that it is not tight in gen-
eral, and show that there cannot be a domain-independent bound, by proving
that for any number of individual u the optimal bound must be at least a cer-
tain expression f(u, ). Finally, they show that the question of providing optimal
upper bounds for the leakage of -differentially private randomized functions in
terms of rational functions of  is decidable, and leave the actual function as an
open question. In our work we used rather different techniques and found (inde-
pendently) the same function f(u, ) (the bound in Theorem 1), but we actually
proved that f(u, ) is the optimal bound6. Another difference is that [3] captures
the case in which the focus of differential privacy is on hiding participation of
individuals in a database. In our work, we consider both the participation and
the values of the participants.
Clarkson and Schneider also considered differential privacy as a case study
of their proposal for quantification of integrity [10]. There, the authors analyze
6 When discussing our result with Barthe and Ko¨pf, they said that they also conjec-
tured that f(u, ) is the optimal bound.
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database privacy conditions from the literature (such as differential privacy, k-
anonymity, and l-diversity) using their framework for utility quantification. In
particular, they study the relationship between differential privacy and a notion
of leakage (which is different from ours - in particular their definition is based
on Shannon entropy) and they provide a tight bound on leakage.
Heusser and Malacaria [17] were among the first to explore the application
of information-theoretic concepts to databases queries. They proposed to model
database queries as programs, which allows for statical analysis of the informa-
tion leaked by the query. However [17] did not attempt to relate information
leakage to differential privacy.
In [16] the authors aim at obtaining optimal-utility randomization mecha-
nisms while preserving differential privacy. The authors propose adding noise to
the output of the query according to the geometric mechanism. Their frame-
work is very interesting in the sense it provides a general definition of utility for
a mechanism M that captures any possible side information and preference (de-
fined as a loss function) the users of M may have. They prove that the geometric
mechanism is optimal in the particular case of counting queries. Our results do
not restrict to counting queries, but on the other hand we only consider the case
of binary loss function.
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